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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No. 930059-CA

vs.

:

LARRY D. PERSON

:

Priority No 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a denial of the Defendant's motion to
modify a judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, County of
Weber, State of Utah rendered by the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann
dated the 9th day of January, 1993.
charged

with

theft

in violation

The Defendant was originally
of

Section

76-6-404

UCA

and

Section 76-6-412 UCA in that the Defendant allegedly exercised
unauthorized control over property of a value of less than $250.00
belonging to Mervyn's Department Store with the purpose to deprive
the owner thereof, and said Defendant had been twice previously
convicted of any theft, robbery or burglary with intent to commit
theft.

On the advice of Counsel the Defendant plead guilty to the

one count of theft, and on the 21st day of October, 1992 was
sentenced to serve a term of 0 to five years at the Utah State
Prison.

The Defendant, pro se, filed a motion to modify the

judgment of the Court, which was denied by Judge Glasmann on the
9th day of January, 1993 as being frivolous.

The Defendant filed,

pro se, an appeal of the said denial of the moticn for modification
1

of judgment, which appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals as
Case Number 930059-CA. Jurisdiction

to hear the

above-entitled

appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code annotated, 78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) and Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by denying the

Defendant's motion for modification of a judgment, wherein the
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 0 to five years at the
Utah State Prison, for theft of property of a value of less than
$250.00 where it was alleged that the Defendant had previously been
convicted of theft.

The Court in entering the sentence relied on

the prosecution's allegations that the Defendant: had twice been
convicted of theft, robbery or burglary involving intent to commit
theft as alleged.

Counsel for the Defendant did net verify whether

the Defendant, had in fact, been twice convicted cf theft, robbery
or burglary involving intent to commit theft.
Standard of Review
plea

of

guilty

to

a

Where a Defendant voluntarily enters a
charge,

the

reviewing

court

will

substantial deference to the decision of the Trial Judge.

give

State v.

Callahan 866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-404
A person
commits
theft
if
he
obtains
or
exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-412
2

(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this
chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds
$1/000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at
the time of the theft;
(iv) property is stolen from the person of
another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is more
than $25 0 but not more than $1,00 0
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of
theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent
to commit theft;
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt,
gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf,
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or
poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was more than $100 but: does not
exceed $250, or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was $100 or less.
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of
Subsection 76-6-408(1) may bring an action against any
person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-408(2) d) for three
times the amount of actual damages if any sustained by
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys
fees .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

Defendant,

by

information,

was

charged

with

theft

in

violation of Section 76-6-404 UCA, wherein it was alleged that he
exercised unauthorized

control over the property of Mervyn ,f s, to

wit: a pair of shoes with a retail value of $55.00.
30,

1992 the Defendant

Glasmann

appeared before

for a pre-trial hearing.

pled not guilty to the information.

On September

the Honorable Michael

The Defendant had

J.

previously

(T. P. 2)

At the preliminary hearing, counsel for Defendant indicated to

3

the Court that the Defendant had negotiated a settlement of the
matter.

The

Defendant

would

plead

guilty

to

the

charge

in

consideration of which the State, through Mr Decaria, would make no
sentencing recommendations.

The State did, however, reserve the

right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record. (T. P. 2)
The Court

then

asked

the Defendant

if he understood

the

agreement and asked if he was going to plead guilty as charged to
a third degree felony,

theft.

The Court reviewed the State's

agreement to make no recommendations as to what the Defendant's
sentence

on

the

Defendant's previous criminal record, if they chose to do so.

The

Defendant

should

told

be,

the

reserving

Judge

he

the

right

understood

to

comment

that

this

correctly

represented the plea bargain, and also that there had been nothing
else represented to him, which had not been explained to the Court.
(T. P. 2)
The
presumed

Trial

Judge

explained

to

the

Defendant

that

he

was

innocent and the State has the burden of proving the

Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court explained

that the State must prove that the Defendant committed a theft in
that

he

obtained

or

exercised

unauthorized

control

over

the

property of Mervyn's shoes, to wit: shoes of a value of less than
$250.00 with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and also that
the Defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft,
robbery or burglary with intent to commit theft.

The Defendant

acknowledged that he knew the elements of the crime that the State
would have to prove against him. (T. P. 4)
4

The Defendant stated he walked in, put on a pair of shoes and
walked out.
penalty

The Court then explained to the Defendant the maximum

for

the

third

degree

felony

was

zero

to

five

years

imprisonment in the Utah State prison and up to a $5,000.00 fine.
(T. P. 5) .

The Defendant pled guilty to the third degree felony,

theft, committed on May 17, 1992. (T. P. 5)

The Court accepted the

Defendant's voluntary plea of guilty (T. P. 6)
On the 21st day of October, 1992 the Defendant appeared before
the Court for sentencing.

(Sentencing T. P. 2)

requested

the

John

Caine

of

Weber

County

The Defendant

Public

Defenders

Association to represent him at the sentencing hearing. (Sentencing
T. P. 2)

Mr. Caine indicated that he had talked to the Defendant

and explained that the sentencing Judge had limited ability to
change much of what's was recommended in the pre-sentence report.
He also explained that the recommendation for prison was a result
of the Defendant's prior record. (Sentencing T. P. 3)
The Court in sentencing the Defendant staced:
"Your past record does box the Court in. Iz will be the
sentence of the Court that you serve zero ~o five years
at the State prison. (Sentencing T. P. 5)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial

Court

committed

reversible

error

in denying as

frivolous the Defendant's pro se motion to modify his sentence.
The Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial
counsel advised the Defendant to plea guilty :o theft, a third
degree felony enhanced by two prior convictions of theft, burglary
or attempted theft, where Counsel did not, in face, verify that the
5

Defendant had been previously convicted twice of the offenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO MODIFY HIS SENTENCE
OF IMPRISONMENT OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS FOR THEFT OF
TENNIS SHOES OF A VALUE OF $55.00
The Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence of zero to
five years for theft, a third degree felony under Section 76-6-612
UCA.

The Defendant was charged by information with third degree

felony, theft in violation of Sections 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 UCA in
that the Defendant obtained or exercised unauthorized control over
the property of Mervyn's Store, to wit: shoes of a value less than
$250.00 with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and said
Defendant had been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery
or burglary with intent to commit theft.
The Weber County Public Defenders was appointed as counsel for
the Defendant and after visiting with counsel, the Defendant pled
guilty to the charge.

In the sentencing hearing the Defendant

requested that John Caine, a Weber County Public Defender, stand
with him at sentencing.
At sentencing the Defendant was again informed that he was
being sentenced for a third degree felony, theft of shoes. (T.
Sentencing Hearing P. 2)
for

his

prior

Further, Mr. Caine stated that, except

convictions,

he

likely

would

not

facing

the

recommendations presented to the sentencing court. (T. Sentencing
Hearing P. 3)

The sentencing Judge also explained to the Defendant
6

that because of his prior record of theft he was boxed in. On
October 21, 1992 the Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment of
Zero to Five years at the State prison. (T. Sentencing Hearing P.
5. )

The Defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea within

the statutory time.
Sometime prior to 9 January, 1993 the Defendant filed a motion
with the District Court for modification of his judgment, which
motion was denied on the 9th day of January, 1994.

The Defendant

filed pro se his notice of appeal of the denial of his motion to
modify the judgment, alleging first, that he did not know at the
time he entered his plea of guilty that he was being charged with
a third degree felony.
arbitrarily

charged

Second, the Defendant stated that he was

with

a Third

Degree

Felony.

Third,

the

Defendant alleged that he was charged under the wrong section of
the Utah Code and that he should only have been charged with petit
theft, a misdemeanor.

Fourth, the Defendant alleged that he was

denied effective assistance of counsel in that counsel did not
explain to him what he was charged with and the possible sentence
if he pleaded guilty to the information.

Fifth, that Defendant

said the prior convictions were not proven in court, and that he
was consequently

sentenced

for based

violation of Due Process of Law.

on charces not proved in

Sixth, the Defendant asserted the

enhancement penalties cannot be imposed until after he has been
convicted of theft.

Finally, the Defendant states that it is cruel

and unusual punishment to sentence the Defendant as a habitual
criminal.
7

For purposes of this appeal, Counsel will address only those
points raised which bear upon of issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel, there being no other substantial arguments, not previously
settled by case law. The Sixth amendment
Constitution

stated

that

" [l}n all

to the United

criminal

States

prosecutions,

the

accused shall enjoy the right to -- have assistance of counsel for
his defense"

U. S, Const. Amend VI

This right has interpreted by

the United States Supreme Court to mean " the right to effective
assistance of counsel". McMann v. Richardson 397 U. S. 759, 771 n.
14, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L. Ed 2d 763, 770.
Court

has

established

a two-part

test

for determining

The same
whether

criminal defendant's have been denied their Sixth Amendment right
as follows:
" First, the Defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient.
The requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
The requires showing the counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2964, 80 L. Ed 2d 674 (1984)
Accord State v.
Tempiin 805 P. 2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)
In order to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland
test,
a
defendant
"must
show
that
counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness: 466 U. S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
However, in making such an analysis, "this court will not
second-guess
trial
counsel's
legitimate
strategic
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in
retrospect. State v. Tenneyson 850 P. 2d 461, 465 (Utah
App 1992) See also Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 194 S.
Ct. at 2065.
In addition, "[o]nce a defendant proves
that counsel's performance failed the reasonableness
test, as measured by prevailing professional standards,
he can meed the prejudice prong only by showing there is
a reasonable probability that
"but for counsel's
8

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different."
Tennyson
850 P. 2d at 466
(quoting Strickland 466 U. S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at
2068) .
Where the claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal,
"we must decide whether defendant was deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel as a matter of law."
Tennyson 850 P. 2d at 466. See also State v. Ellifritz
835 P. 2d 170, 175 (Utah App 1992)
State v. Callahan
866 P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993)
This Court in the case of State v. Anderson

797 P. 2d 1114 (

Utah App 1990) held that to rely on prior convictions the State
must furnish copies of the convictions. It is not sufficient for
the Court to rely on unverified transcripts or records, which may
or may not be accurate.
Counsel for the Defendant, in recommending ~hat the Defendant
plead guilty to a third degree felony, theft relied on a so-called
"rap

sheet",

convictions.

which

purportedly

showed

the

Defendant's

At no time did the trial counsel, in fact, verify

that the information on the rap sheet was in facz
counsel

was

prior

relying

solely

on

information

accurate.
furnished

Trial

by

the

prosecutor as to his prior convictions.
The Defendant's counsel's performance in recommending that the
Defendant
deficient.

plead

guilty

to

theft,

a

third

degree

felony

was

If the records were inaccurate and the Defendant had

not twice been previously convicted of either theft, burglary or
robbery with an intent to commit theft, then the Defendant was not
guilty of a third degree felony.

Absence any evidence showing that

trial counsel in fact verified the prior convictions he should not
have recommended the Defendant plead guilty to uhe information as
charged.
9

CONCLUSION
The trial judge committed reversible error in denying the
Defendant's motion for modification of his sentence, where the
Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in making his
plea of guilty to a third degree felony, theft with two prior
convictions of theft, burglary, or robbery with intent to commit
theft, where said counsel had not verified that the Defendant had
twice been so convicted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

8

day of June, 1995

Stephen A. Laker
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed one true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's Office, 23 6
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid
this
£>
day of June, 1995.

Stephen A. Laker
^
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

1
2
3

THE COURT:
0449-

State of Utah vs. Larry D. Person, case

Time for Pre-Trial, and our trial having been set for

October the 9th.

4

MR- FROERER:

Your Honor, we have a negotiated

5

settlement of this matter.

6

guilty to the charge.

7

going to make no sentencing recommendation, though he does

8

THE COURT:

10

THE COURT:

12

MR. DAINES:

13

16
17
18
19

THE COURT:

Is that the State's understanding?
That's correct, your Honor.
Mr. Person, you have heard that

to the third degree felony, theft.

That the State agrees to

make no recommendation as to what your sentence should be, but]
does reserve the right to comment on your previous criminal
record if they so choose.

You understand that that is the

plea bargain?
MR. PERSON:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, I do.
Is there anything else that's been

represented to you that has not been disclosed here?

23

MR. PERSON;

24
25

That's it.

representation, that you are going to plead guilty as charged

20

22

Anything else?

MR. FROERER:

11

15

The State, through Mr. Decaria, is

reserve the right to comment on Mr. Person's prior record.

9

14

Mr. Person is going to plead

THE COURT:

No.
All right.

Do you have a clear mind

today?
2

1
2

right to appeal from anything that might have occurred during
that trial?

3

MR. PERSON:

4

THE COURT:

The State has the burden of proving your guilty, as I have

6

said, beyond a reasonable doubt.

7

must prove in this case, that you committed a theft.

8

obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property

9

of Mervyn's Shoes, to wit, shoes, of a value less than $250. OCJ

The State has alleged, and
That youj

10

with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof.

11

have been twice previously convicted of any theft, robbery or

12

burglary with intent to commit theft.

MR. DAINES:

15

THE COURT:

MR. PERSON:

18

THE COURT:

MR. PERSON:

21

23
24
25

Do you understand that those are the

Yes, I do.
Are you pleading guilty in this case

because you in fact committed the theft?

20

22

Yes, that's correct, your Honor.

elements the State would have to prove against you?

17

19

And that you

Is that correct, Mr. Daines?

14

16

C3
Z

In this case you are presumed innocent.

5

13

Q
Z

Yes.

Yes, I am.

THE COURT:

Tell the Court what happened briefly if

MR. PERSON:

Well, I walked in and put on a pair of

you would.

shoes and walked out.
THE COURT:

All right.

Do you understand that the
4|

1
2

maximum penalty for the third degree felony is zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison and up to $5,000.00 in fines?

3

MR. PERSON:

4

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

You understand that notwithstanding

5

what f s been said or represented to you, that it is up to the

6

Court to sentence you.

7

maximum penalty?

8
9
10

15
16
17
18

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. PERSON;

12

14

MR. PERSON:

At this time do you need any morej

time to think about this, or to consult with your attorney?

11

13

And the Court can sentence you to the

No, I don't.

THE COURT:

As to the third degree felony, theft,

alleged to have been committed on May 17, 1992, how do you
plead?
MR. PERSON:

Guilty.

MR. FROERER:
THE COURT:

I do have a statement, your Honor.
Pardon?

MR. FROERER:

We do have a statement.

19

THE COURT:
z

Very good.

If ycu will approach the

20

Bench, Mr. Froerer.
21

Your attorney, Mr. Person, has provided me with a

2
CE

o

22

Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea of Guilty.

Has your)

23

attorney been over that with you?
24

MR. PERSON:

Yes, he has.

25

THE COURT:

He explained it to you?
5

1

MR. PERSON:

2
3

THE COURT:
Larry Person,

4

6
7
8
9

THE COURT:

Yes, it is.
All right.

The Court will find that you

knowingly and voluntarily entered your plea of guilty.
I want to advise you, as I have previous Defendants, that}
you have 3 0 days from today within which to bring a Motion to
Withdraw your Plea of Guilty.

It doesn't mean the Court will

10

grant it, but if you don f t bring it within that 3 0 days, it i^

11

not timely.

12

14

Do you understand that?

MR. PERSON:

13

THE COURT:
for sentencing.

Yes, I do.
All right.

PROBATION OFFICER:

16

MR. FROERER:

18
19
20

z
21

This matter needs to be set

The Probation Office looking for three weeks?|

15

17

Q
<
O

It appears to contain the signature of

Is that your signature on page five?

MR. PERSON;

5

Yes, he did.

Yes, your Honor.

Your Honor, he is requesting sooner

than that.
THE COURT:

Let me ask this question:

Do we have

any—have you ever been on probation before this Court
previous to this?
MR. PERSON:

Yes, I have.

2

o

22
23
24

THE COURT:
MR. PERSON:

How long ago?
Quite a while ago.

I have been on

parole, though.

25

MR. DAINES:

That's what partially complicates this
6|

1
2

THE COURT:
0449

3
4
5

MR. GRAVIS:

too, so we will have to pass that.
THE COURT:

MR. GRAVIS:

We will pass

Yes, your Honor.

* * *

10
11

This is on for sentencing.

that,

8
9

Your Honor, I was prepared to go on Mr.

Person, but he indicates he wanted to talk to John about it,

6
7

State of Utah vs. Larry Person, case

THE COURT:

Mr. Caine, did ycu have a chance to talk

to Mr. Person?

12

MR. CAINE:

I did.

13

THE COURT:

Case 0449, State vs. Larry Person.

14

MR. CAINE:

This is Mr. Person.

We can do that now.

This is actually

15

Mr. Froerer and Mr. Miles1 case, but I have — if you go back to

16

the beginning on page 4, I have known Mr. Persons since about

17
18
19

1979.

So I have had something to do with the rest of those

cases, so he wanted me to stand up here with him.
THE COURT:

All right.

Well, this is the time for

Q

<

O

20

z
21
2
QC

o

22
23
24
25

sentencing on the third degree felony, theft, charge.

Is

there any legal reason why sentence should not be imposed?
MR. CAINE:

There is none.

THE COURT:

Do you wish to speak to this matter?

MR. CAINE:

Yes, in this respect, Judge, I have

talked with Larry and indicated to him that you have very
2

1
2
3

limited ability to change much of what's recommended here in
this report.

And that's primarily based upon his prior

record.

4

The one thing that's a little troubling to me frankly is
5
6
7
8
9

supervision type parole from that point in time until June of
1992.

That was actually the best period of time that he has

had probably in the last 15 years.

I was a little

disappointed that Ms. Vincent did not detail that in a little

11

more detail in her report because in effect he had no

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
2

o

time, which was in May of 1990, he was basically on intensive

10

12

<
O
z

that if you go back to Larry's release from prison the last

22
23
24
25

violations in that period; did well, worked, and was doing
pretty well.
What happened is, which has been a pattern in his life
unfortunately, this locks it right in, he is obviously
starting to use heroin again.

And then we have the theft.

That's been Larry's Achilles' heel unfortunately is his use of
heroin.

The theft is a $55.00 pair of sneakers, which as I

have indicated to him if he were standing here the first time,
we wouldn't be standing here because that would be a
misdemeanor.

But he is burdened of course with is past.

The problem is he will be sent back down to prison, if
that's the sentence, given a parole date, because he is not
the kind of guy that does badly down there, and the problem
still doesn't get cured.

And that is, he has a substance
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If the person wants to go through any kind of a rehab pi v.
at the prison, those are made available to him.

people who want to get off those substances down there, I
think they have effective programs,
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For thoi

MR. CAINE: And let me just say what Mr. Daines
theoretically is true.

The problem is that the programs

still obviously administered within the confines of the
prison.

It is not a situation where you get released,

there are some problems incumbent in that sort of situat^
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because of the drug problem that exists at the prison.
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not the most conducive place to do it.
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there are programs available.
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But he is correct

I just con't think they a:

very successful.
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THE COURT:

Mr. Person, I car. imagine you might

better under intensive supervision because you are being
followed and watched closely.
causes you to behave better.

That may be an incentive t;
And that may be why you pe:

better under that situation.
Unfortunately, our society is not set up for you to
intensively supervised the rest of your life to avoid sli;
back into the heroin problem or committing thefts.
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Your past record does box the Court in.

It will be •

sentence of the Court that you serve zero to five years a;
State Prison.
$55.00.

And that you pay restitution in the amount

It will be the further order of the Court that y

